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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kyle Jorgensen appeals, contending the district court violated his Fifth
Amendment rights by relying on his decision to invoke his right to remain silent and not
participate in the psychosexual evaluation (PSE) when it withdrew from a binding plea
agreement and imposed a longer sentence on him.

He preserved this challenge

through a motion filed pursuant to I.C.R. 35. The State contends that the district court
lost “jurisdiction”1 over that motion because it did not rule within 120 days of the
judgment without reasonable justification, and that the district court’s reliance on
Mr. Jorgensen’s decision to stand silent did not violate his rights. The State is mistaken
in both respects.
First, the record demonstrates the district court maintained authority to rule on
Mr. Jorgensen’s motion under I.C.R. 35(a), which provides that a motion to correct an
illegal sentence may be filed at any time.

Alternatively, to the extent that

Mr. Jorgensen’s motion is construed as a plea for leniency or a motion to correct as
sentence imposed in an illegal manner under I.C.R. 35(b), the district court maintained
authority over that motion because it ruled within a reasonable time.
Second, when the controlling authority is properly understood, the district court’s
reliance on Mr. Jorgensen’s decision to stand silent is revealed to be a violation of his
constitutional rights. Therefore, this Court should reduce Mr. Jorgensen’s sentence as it

In this context, the term “jurisdiction” is more properly understood to be the district
court’s authority to rule on the motion. State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 375 (Ct. App.
2008).
1

1

deems appropriate or, alternatively, remand this case for a new sentencing
determination.
The State contends the merits of this issue fall under an open question in Idaho.
Mr. Jorgensen asserts that, while the Idaho Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on
that question, a proper understanding and application of its precedent resolves the
issue. Since the Response Brief was filed, the Court of Appeals has evaluated this
issue in similar cases, which Mr. Jorgensen contends is in contrast with the Idaho
Supreme Court’s precedent on this issue. As such, the Idaho Supreme Court should
retain this case to resolve the confusion on this issue.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Jorgensen’s Appellant’s Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether the district court violated Mr. Jorgensen’s Fifth Amendment rights by imposing
a longer sentence as the result of Mr. Jorgensen’s decision to exercise his right to not
answer questions during a psychosexual evaluation.
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Violated Mr. Jorgensen’s Fifth Amendment Rights By Imposing A
Longer Sentence As The Result Of Mr. Jorgensen’s Decision To Exercise His Right To
Not Answer Questions During A Psychosexual Evaluation
A.

The District Court Did Not Lose Authority To Rule On Mr. Jorgensen’s I.C.R. 35
Motion
Mr. Jorgensen’s motion is unclear as to whether it is filed pursuant to I.C.R. 35(a)

or I.C.R. 35(b):
The Defendant, by and through his attorney of record . . . pursuant to Rule 35,
Idaho Criminal Rules, respectfully moves the Court to reconsider the
indeterminate portion of the sentence previously imposed . . . by and for the
reason that a Defendant’s exercise of his 5th Amendment rights to refuse to
answer questions on a psychosexual evaluation cannot be used against him as
part of the basis for his sentence.
(See R., p.96) While the State contends this claim should be evaluated under I.C.R. 35
(b) (Resp. Br., pp.5-6), Mr. Jorgensen maintains that it alleges an illegal sentence under
I.C.R. 35(a), as Mr. Jorgensen claimed the sentence was based on negative inferences
unlawfully drawn from his exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent.
Regardless, under either provision, the district court maintained authority to rule on
Mr. Jorgensen’s motion.
1.

The District Court Had Authority To Rule On Mr. Jorgensen’s Motion
Under I.C.R. 35(a)

The district court had authority to rule on Mr. Jorgensen’s motion. Idaho Criminal
Rule 35(a) states: “The court may correct a sentence that is illegal from the face of the
record at any time.” Mr. Jorgensen has claimed the sentence is illegal because it is
premised on a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
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The Idaho Supreme Court has explained, “the term ‘illegal sentence’ under Rule
35 is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record, i.e.,
does not involve significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing.” 2
State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86 (2009). In this case, the relevant facts are clear:
the statements which demonstrate the district court’s improper consideration of
Mr. Jorgensen’s decision to remain silent during the PSE are memorialized in written
documents and the verbatim transcripts of the hearings in this case.

(See App.

Br., pp.6-17 (discussing the various comments which detail the district court’s error).)
Therefore, the record was clear because there were no questions of fact that would
need to be resolved for the courts to adequately assess the alleged illegality of the
sentence. Compare Clements, 148 Idaho at 87. As a result, the district court had
continuing authority to rule on Mr. Jorgensen’s motion under I.C.R. 35(a).
2.

Alternatively, The District Court Ruled On The Motion Within A
“Reasonable Time”

The State contends that Mr. Jorgensen’s motion should be evaluated under
I.C.R. 35(b) as it interprets that motion as a request to correct a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner. (See Resp. Br., p.5-6.) It also argues that the record does not show a
reasonable delay which would justify allowing the district court to rule on that motion
beyond the 120-day filing deadline. (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.) Even if the State is correct and

Mr. Jorgensen recognizes that, in some recent decisions, Idaho’s courts have
evaluated I.C.R. 35(a) in terms of “clear from the face of the judgment.” See, e.g.,
State v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 66 (2015) (“Wolfe’s reliance on [State v. Lute, 150 Idaho
837 (2011)] is unavailing, as it is not clear from the face of the judgment that Wolfe’s
sentence was illegal . . . .”). However, the plain language of the rule is not so limited –
the error must simply be clear from the face of the record. I.C.R. 35(a).
2
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Mr. Jorgensen’s motion is properly analyzed under I.C.R. 35(b), the district court did not
lose authority to rule on his motion because, based on the facts of this case, the district
court ruled within a reasonable time.
Mr. Jorgensen’s motion was filed on July 11, 2014, approximately three months
after the judgment was entered in his case. (See R., p.78 (the order of commitment,
file-stamped Apr. 22, 2014); R., p.96 (Mr. Jorgensen’s motion).) Two months after the
motion was filed, on September 19, 2014, a hearing was scheduled for November 25,
2014, on Mr. Jorgensen’s motion. (See R., p.4.) The district court issued its order the
same day as the hearing. (R., p.105.) Therefore, the motion was resolved within four
months of the timely filing of the motion.
As an initial matter though, the Idaho courts have explained, the rationale
underlying the requirement for a ruling within the 120-day period in the first place is to
protect against the district court invading the province of the parole board, and so,
violating the separation of powers doctrine. State v. Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 353
(1992) (quoting United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 208-09 (9th Cir. 1981)).
However, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has subsequently explained, such a violation
arises when the delay in ruling on the motion is designed to allow the district court to
“consider a defendant’s subsequent conduct while incarcerated” in its ultimate decision.
State v. Tranmer, 135 Idaho 614, 618 (Ct. App. 2001).

Thus, the rule is:

“The

‘reasonable time’ granted to the trial court is ‘a reasonable time to decide the issue
presented by the rule 35 motion, not a license to wait and reevaluate the sentencing
decision in the light of subsequent developments.” Id. at 616 (quoting Diggs v. United
States, 740 F.2d 239, 246-47 (3rd Cir. 1987) (emphasis from Tranmer).
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The corollary to that rule, as the Court of Appeals has also explained, is that,
when the issues raised in a Rule 35 motion are not aimed at having the district court
usurp the power of the parole board, nor would a favorable decision on the issues
raised have done so, the justification for enforcing the requirement for a ruling within
120 days. State v. Fisch, 142 Idaho 781, 785 (Ct. App. 2006). For example, in Fisch,
the Court of Appeals found a thirteen-month delay in ruling on a Rule 35 motion was
reasonable because the record did not disclose any act by the trial court indicating the
purpose or effect of infringing on the authority of the parole board. Id. Rather than
seeking to reevaluate the defendant based on his behavior while incarcerated, the Court
was awaiting completion of a psychosexual evaluation it deemed necessary to fully
address the claim for sentence reduction raised in the Rule 35 motion because it was
necessary to adequately consider “mental health, character and likelihood of
recidivism,” in that decision. Id. Thus, without evidence that the district court was, in
fact or in effect, usurping the parole board’s function, the Court of Appeals rejected the
State’s argument for strict adherence to the requirement of a ruling within the 120period. Id.; see also Chapman, 121 Idaho at 355 (explaining that, in a case involving a
twenty-nine-month delay, the decision might still impermissibly, “although perhaps
unintentionally,” usurp the parole board’s authority).
Like the motion at issue in Fisch, Mr. Jorgensen’s motion does not invoke the
concerns which the requirement for a ruling within the 120-day period is designed to
address, as he is not asking for a reduction of his sentence based on his conduct while
incarcerated. (See R., p.96.) Rather, he is asking the courts to address a violation of
his Constitutional rights which occurred during the initial imposition of sentence.
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(R., p.96.) Because the issue raised by the motion was static and Mr. Jorgensen’s
conduct in custody was not relevant to the resolution of that issue, the risk that a
decision on his motion would violate the separation of powers doctrine is not present.
Compare Fisch, 142 Idaho at 785. Therefore, it was reasonable for the district court to
rule on that motion outside the 120-day period.
The record in this case also shows that the delay in the ruling was reasonable.
Compare State v. Veloquio, 141 Idaho 154, 155-56 (Ct. App. 2005). In Veloquio, the
Court of Appeals explained that a five-month delay in ruling on the defendant’s Rule 35
motion was reasonable based on the specific facts in the record, which included the
need for counsel to investigate the motion, the need for a hearing to be held, and the
need for the district court to duly consider all the information presented in regard to the
motion. Id. Many similar facts exist in the record in this case.
For example, Mr. Jorgensen’s motion required a hearing. Critically, when the
district court decided to set that hearing, it had to set it for two months later.
(See R., p.4 (register of actions noting that the hearing was scheduled on
September 19, 2014, for November 25, 2014.) That is unsurprising, since the district
court judge presiding over the case does not normally sit in Fremont County.3 See
Chapman, 121 Idaho at 353 (indicating a judge’s obligations to serve in another district

This Court should take judicial notice of the fact that the district court judge presiding
over this case, Judge Moeller, is chambered in Madison County. Idaho Judicial
Directory, p.9, available at http://isc.idaho.gov/files/judicial_directory.pdf (last accessed
Jan. 26, 2016). This Court should also take judicial notice of the fact that this district
court judge has obligations in several other counties in the Seventh Judicial District
beside his home county. See, e.g., State v. Jimenez, ___ P.3d ___, 2015 WL 7785141,
*6 (Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2015) (noting this same district court judge has also been asked to
preside over cases as far south as Bingham County), pet review filed.
3
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is one potential justification for not resolving a Rule 35 motion within the 120-day
period). The judge’s calendar is not the only relevant calendar in this regard. Defense
counsel would also have to be available for the hearing, and according to the Idaho
State Bar attorney roster, he, too, would be traveling from a different county. See Idaho
State Bar, Attorney Roster Search, https://isb.idaho.gov/licensing/attorney_roster_ind.
cfm?IDANumber=3007 (last accessed Jan. 25, 2016) (listing defense counsel’s office as
located in Idaho Falls, which, this Court can take judicial notice, is in Bonneville
County).
Additionally, the fact that, when the hearing was scheduled in September 2014, it
had to be scheduled for two months later is particularly important in this case, since
Mr. Jorgensen timely filed his motion with only forty days (slightly over one month) left in
the 120-day period. (See R., p.78 (the judgment of conviction, file-stamped Apr. 22,
2014); R., p.96 (Mr. Jorgensen’s motion, file-stamped July 11, 2014).

Thus, the

concern the Idaho Supreme Court identified in Chapman is fully evident in this case:
the district court could not have reasonably scheduled the needed hearing on
Mr. Jorgensen’s timely-filed motion within the 120-day period. Compare Chapman, 121
Idaho at 353-54 (indicating this is the sort of situation where the district court’s authority
to rule on the motion will continue for a reasonable time beyond the 120-day period).
Furthermore, these scheduling issues demonstrate that the implied concern in
the State’s argument – that Mr. Jorgensen had not precipitated action on his motion
(see Resp. Br., p.6) – is mistaken. Action was, in fact, precipitated on the motion on
September 19, 2014, as a hearing was scheduled on the motion. (See R., p.4.) The
two-month period between the initial filing of the motion and the setting for a hearing in
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September 2014 is also not unreasonable because it allowed time for a potential
response from the State or such other follow-up documents the parties may have
deemed necessary to be filed.
In addition to the scheduling issues, the district court pointed out that this case
was complex, and so, reasonably required additional time to adequately consider the
motion: “I would let you know, [defense counsel], that in preparation for the hearing
today I went back and reviewed my notes of the original sentencing as well as the
original PSI and have re-familiarized myself with the difficult case that was complex, and
I think I’ve got my head wrapped back around it.” (Tr., Vol.3, p.4, Ls.10-15.) The order
the district court ultimately issued on the motion also indicates that the district court
needed time to “review[] the offered exhibits, and consider[] the oral argument of
counsel” before it could make its decision. (R., p.105.) Thus, forcing the district court to
try and resolve Mr. Jorgensen’s timely Rule 35 motion within the 120-day period would
have been impracticable on the particular facts of this case. As a result, it continued to
have authority to rule on that motion for a reasonable time beyond that 120-day period.
The motion was, in fact, resolved within a reasonable time of the motion’s filing (four
months).

Compare Fisch, 142 Idaho at 785 (finding a thirteen-month delay was

reasonable on similar facts); Veloquio, 141 Idaho at 155-56 (finding a five-month delay
was reasonable on similar facts).
For all these reasons, the record demonstrates that the district court’s delay in
ruling on the motion was reasonable, and as such, the district court had continuing
authority to rule on Mr. Jorgensen’s Rule 35 motion.
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B.

The District Court’s Reliance On Mr. Jorgensen’s Decision To Remain Silent
During The Psychosexual Evaluation To Justify Withdrawing From The Binding
Plea Agreement, And So, Impose A Longer Unified Sentence, Violated
Mr. Jorgensen’s Fifth Amendment Rights
1.

Proper Application Of Idaho Supreme Court Precedent Reveals That The
District Court Violated Mr. Jorgensen’s Fifth Amendment Rights

The State contends that a district court does not err by drawing adverse
inferences about the defendant’s risk to reoffend from the defendant’s decision to stand
silent during the PSE process, and so, asserts there was no error in this case.
(Resp. Br., pp.14-22.)

That argument ignores the United States Supreme Court’s

discussion of this precise issue in Estelle v. Smith: “If, upon being adequately warned,
respondent [defendant] had indicated he would not answer [the psychiatrist’s]
questions, . . . the State must make its case on future dangerousness in some other
way.” Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468-69 (1981).
That determination was the product of the Fifth Amendment protection, which the
Supreme Court explained was “as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to
guard, and the privilege is fulfilled only when a criminal defendant is guaranteed the
right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.” Id. (internal quotations omitted;
ellipsis from original) (emphasis added); c.f. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564
(2006).

The State concedes this is so:

“Therefore, a defendant may decline

participation in a psychosexual evaluation ordered by the district court, and the court
may not penalize the defendant for this decision.” (Resp. Br., p.8.)
Despite its concession about the scope of the Fifth Amendment right, the State
contends that drawing adverse inferences about future dangerousness does not
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constitute a penalty for invoking the right to not disclose.

(Resp. Br., p.8 n.2

(summarizing the nature of the State’s argument); see generally Resp. Br., pp.14-22.)
First, as the United States Supreme Court has indicated, whether something is a
“penalty,” as opposed to withholding a benefit, is a meaningless distinction. McKune v.
Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 46 (2002) (four-Justice plurality explaining that the answer to this
question “rests entirely in the eye of the beholder. For this reason, emphasis of any
baseline, while superficially appealing, would be an inartful addition to an already
confused area of jurisprudence”); McKune, 536 U.S. at 64-65 (four-Justice dissent
explaining that such a distinction is irrelevant because it is also unconstitutional to
“threaten to take away privileges as the cost of invoking Fifth Amendment rights”).
Second, the State’s argument is erroneous because it ignores Estrada’s holdings
in regard to the Fifth Amendment right in this context. As the Idaho Supreme Court
explained: “The real issue presented [in Estrada] is the significance and extent of a
defendant’s right against self-incrimination.” Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564. In resolving
that issue, the Supreme Court held:

“Imposition of a harsher sentence within this

expansive range [of permissible sentencing under the applicable statute] based on a
defendant’s statements in a psychological evaluation is a violation of the right against
self-incrimination.” Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564.
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that a corollary to that
right against self-incrimination: a defendant who is assured by the court “that his claim
of privilege would be granted might well be entrapped if his assertion of the privilege
could then be used against him. . . . Elementary fairness requires that an accused
should not be misled on that score.” Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189, 197
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(1943). Thus, “[i]f he receives assurance that it will be granted if claimed, or if it is
claimed and granted outright, he has every right to expect that the ruling is made in
good faith and the rule against comment will be observed.” Id. And while Johnson was
addressing the right in the context of a comment on silence during the guilt phase, its
analysis and reasoning are equally applicable to the application of the right in the
penalty phase. As both the United States and Idaho Supreme Courts have held, there
is no discernable reason for the right to function differently in the penalty phase than it
does in the guilt phase. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 462-63; State v. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215,
218 (1994) (expressly extending Estelle’s rule to the penalty phase of a case resolved
by guilty plea).
Since the Idaho Supreme Court in Estrada assured defendants they have the
right to know they have the right to not disclose information during a PSE, those
defendants have every right to expect that decision was made in good faith and the rule
against comment on their exercise of that right will be observed. Holding otherwise
would be fundamentally unfair, rendering Estrada an empty promise. On a related note,
the district court itself assured Mr. Jorgensen at the change of plea hearing that he had
the right to not answer questions in during the PSE. (Tr., Vol.1, p.22, L.17 - p.23, L.24.)
Therefore, Mr. Jorgensen had assurances from two courts that he could choose to
remain silent during the PSE if he, on the advice of counsel, so chose. Therefore, he
had every right to expect those assurances were made in good faith and the rule
against comment on his decision to exercise that right would be observed.
However, the district court’s explanations of its decision to withdraw from the
binding plea agreement reveal that it was not holding to those assurances.
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The

expressed reason it withdrew from that plea agreement was that Mr. Jorgensen invoked
his right to not disclose information during the PSE process:

“[A]s the Court has

previously indicated, that because the defendant didn’t fully participate in a presentence
investigation or produce a non deceptive polygraph, the Court is withdrawing consent”
to the binding plea agreement. (Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.7-11 (summarizing the explanations it
gave in its notice of withdrawal of consent); see also R., pp.67-68 (the district court’s
notice of withdrawal of consent, identifying the first reason for withdrawing that consent
was “1. Defendant refused to disclose information or answer any questions concerning
his past sexual history”).)

Therefore, the district court did more than comment on

Mr. Jorgensen’s decision to exercise his right; it penalized him for his decision to stand
silent by using his silence as the basis to increase the term of his sentence. That is
contrary to the valid expectations he would have had from the courts’ assertions about
his right to stand silent.
The district court proceeded to impose a longer unified sentence than
contemplated by the binding plea agreement on Mr. Jorgensen. (Compare R., pp.48-49
(binding plea agreement calling for a unified sentence of five years, with two years
fixed), with R., p.78 (district court ultimately imposing a unified sentence of fifteen years,
with two years fixed).) In imposing that sentence, it again expressly commented on the
fact that Mr. Jorgensen did not provide information about past offenses, using that
silence to justify its refusal to retain jurisdiction in that decision: “if the defendant isn’t
going to cooperate in answering questions about other offenses, I can only conclude
that retained jurisdiction would be pointless in further ascertaining his risk.” (Tr., Vol.2,
p.23, Ls.2-17.) Applying the rules from Estelle, Estrada, and Johnson to this record, it is
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clear that, by abandoning the binding agreement to a particular sentence and imposing
a harsher sentence based on Mr. Jorgensen’s decision to stand silent, the district court
violated his Fifth Amendment right.
In this regard, it is irrelevant that the district court’s primary objection to the plea
agreement was to the indeterminate portion of the sentence and that it ultimately
imposed the same fixed term contemplated by the plea agreement.

(See Resp.

Br., pp.12-13.) The State’s argument in that regard is inconsistent with the record.
Regardless of whether the parties had discussed a plea with a longer indeterminate
portion, the agreement submitted to, and subsequently rejected by, the district court
called for it to impose a five-year unified sentence.

(R., pp.48-49; R., p.67 (in

withdrawing from the binding plea agreement, “Specifically, the Court rejects
paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Plea Agreement, which bind the Court to impose no more
than a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed and three years
indeterminate.”).)
Furthermore, when reviewing the length of a sentence, “we consider the
defendant’s entire sentence,” fixed and indeterminate components together. State v.
Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007). Therefore, the proper focus of whether a sentence
is “harsher” under Estrada is on the unified term of the sentence, not its constituent
fixed or indeterminate components. The district court imposed a unified sentence ten
years longer than the one contemplated in the binding plea agreement. (See R., p.78.)
Thus, regardless of the focus of its objection, it still imposed a harsher sentence on
Mr. Jorgensen based on his decision to not disclose information in the PSE.

(See

R., pp.67-68 (explaining why the district court withdrew its consent).) That increase in
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the term of the overall unified sentence constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment
right under Estelle and Estrada.
Similarly, the potential that the risk assessment in the PSE might have been
different4 had Mr. Jorgensen not exercised his right to remain silent is irrelevant
because the district court expressly imposed the sentence it did based on the evaluation
the PSE actually returned: “Because you were evaluated as a high risk, I want to
ensure that you have a long period of supervision, and so the [indeterminate portion of
the sentence] is going to be significant.” (Tr., Vol.2, p.21, Ls.14-17 (emphasis added).)
The district court’s reasons for rejecting the binding plea agreement demonstrate that
the risk assessment actually made in the PSE was based on Mr. Jorgensen’s decision
to exercise his right to not disclose information during the PSE. (R., p.67 (“Given the
incomplete information available to him, [the evaluator] has rated Defendant at a
minimum as a ‘high-moderate’ risk to reoffend and concluded he requires incarceration
for community protection purposes.”).)
As the Court of Appeals has explained, a defendant’s “Fifth Amendment rights
come into play if disclosures made during a competency evaluation, or medical
conclusions derived from such disclosures, are later used against the defendant at
either the guilt or penalty phase of the proceedings.” State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho
817, 820 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Estelle, 451 U.S. at 465 and Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564)
(emphasis added). Since the district court actually based its sentencing decision on the

The district thought Mr. Jorgensen’s risk level might actually be lower had he
participated fully in the PSE. (Tr., Vol.3, p.5, Ls.15-18 (“And the feeling I had reading
the report is that it was probably higher than it would have been if he had talked about
information about his past . . . . .”). However, the State argued, based on comments in
the PSE itself, Mr. Jorgensen’s risk level could have been higher. (Resp. Br., p.10.)

4
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conclusion of the PSE evaluator, and the PSE evaluator’s conclusion was inflated
because Mr. Jorgensen exercised his right to not disclose information during the PSE,
the harsher sentence based on that conclusion violates the Fifth Amendment under
Estrada and Estelle.
Finally, the fact that the district court claimed it did not intend to consider
Mr. Jorgensen’s silence or punish him for asserting his Fifth Amendment right is
irrelevant.

(Compare Resp. Br., p.12; see e.g., R., pp.67-68 (recognizing

Mr. Jorgensen’s rights under Estrada).) Incidental violations of Constitutional rights are
still violations of Constitutional rights. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582
(1968) (holding that, when the district court’s imposition of sentence would have the
effect of chilling others from exercising their constitutional rights in future cases, “[t]he
question is not whether the chilling effect is ‘incidental’ rather than intentional; the
question is whether that effect is unnecessary and therefore excessive.”).
In fact, the fact that the district court told Mr. Jorgensen that he could exercise
that right (Tr., Vol.1, p.22, L.17 – p.23, L.10), then punished him for his subsequent
exercise of that right is particularly problematic regardless of the district court’s intent:
“When [the court] grants the claim of privileges but allows it to be used against the
accused to his prejudice, we cannot disregard the matter. That procedure has such
potentialities of oppressive use that we will not sanction its use in the federal courts over
which we have supervisory power.”5 Johnson, 318 U.S. at 199 (emphasis added).

When the Johnson decision was issued in 1948, its supervisory authority was limited
to the federal courts, as the right against self-incrimination would not be incorporated
against the states until 1964. See Mallory v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (incorporating
that right). Therefore, Johnson’s interpretation of that right and its prohibition against

5
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Therefore, the district court’s intent was irrelevant – its actions violated Mr. Jorgensen’s
Fifth Amendment rights and this Court should not disregard the matter.
Ultimately, the district court withdrew from the binding plea agreement based on
Mr. Jorgensen’s decision to remain silent. It relied on the PSE author’s conclusion as to
the risk of future dangerousness, which was inflated based on Mr. Jorgensen’s decision
to remain silent, to impose a longer sentence than contemplated by the binding plea
agreement. As a result, the district court imposed an enhanced, harsher sentence
based on Mr. Jorgensen’s decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent. This fact remains true regardless of whatever other sentencing factors the district
court considered in that decision because of the unique facts presented by this case.
(See generally Resp. Br., pp.9-13 (arguing that there was no error because the district
court considered other factors).) Since the State concedes that Estrada, based on
Estelle, provides the district court cannot enhance the penalty imposed because of the
defendant’s decision to exercise his right (Resp. Br., p.8), and proper application of
Estrada, Estelle, and Johnson reveals that is exactly what the district court did in this
case, there was a violation of Mr. Jorgensen’s Fifth Amendment right.
2.

To The Extent There Is An Open Question As To Whether The District
Court Can Draw Adverse Inferences About Future Dangerousness From A
Defendant’s Invocation Of The Fifth Amendment, This Court Should Rule
In The Negative

Despite its concession that Estrada holds that a defendant may not be penalized
for his decision to remain silent during the PSE process, the State argues that the

oppressive use of contrary procedures was necessarily incorporated against the states
when Mallory was issued.
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question of whether the district court can draw inferences about a defendant’s future
dangerousness from his silence and can impose a harsher sentence as a result of that
determination is an open question, and this Court should hold that process permissible.
(Resp. Br., pp.14-22.) The State’s argument is erroneous on several levels.
a.

The Idaho Supreme Court’s Precedent, When Properly Understood
And Applied, Resolves This Issue

While it is true that the Idaho Supreme Court has not issued an express decision
on the precise question, the issue is resolved by a proper application of its decision in
Estrada. Because of the nature of the PSE and the statements typically contained
therein, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that part of the Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent is the right to refuse to answer questions in such an evaluation. Estrada,
143 Idaho at 562-64. As it has since reaffirmed: “In Estrada, we held that a defendant
who has pled guilty still had a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination with
respect to a court-ordered psychological evaluation.” State v. Moore, 150 Idaho 17, 19
n.1 (2010). This right includes scenarios where the defendant validly claims the right
and remains silent, particularly if he does so after the court assures him that his claim to
the right will be respected. Johnson, 318 U.S. at 197.
As demonstrated in Section B(1), supra, proper application of Estrada resolves
the matter. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has effectively answered the “open”
question as to whether the district court can draw negative inferences from the
defendant’s decision to remain silent during the PSE process. The answer, under Idaho
Supreme Court precedent, is that it cannot.
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Since the Idaho Supreme Court’s precedent resolves the issue, the State’s
argument in favor of allowing the district court to draw adverse inferences from the
defendant’s silence, which is based primarily on the decisions from other states, should
be rejected. (See Resp. Br., pp.19-20.) Idaho’s courts are expected to follow the
decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court when that Court has ruled on an issue. See,
e.g., State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271, 272 n.1 (2013).
Further, adopting the State’s argument would render Estrada a nullity. It would
result in the defendant being entitled to be advised by counsel that he has a theoretical
right to remain silent during the PSE process, but the reality being that he could not
exercise that right without subjecting himself to an enhanced sentence based on
negative inferences that would be drawn from his silence.

The Second Circuit

explained the problem with this scenario best: “But while it is true that a defendant’s
lack of desire for rehabilitation may properly be considered in imposing sentence, to
permit the sentencing judge to infer such lack of desire from a defendant’s refusal to
provide testimony would leave little force to the rule that a defendant may not be
punished for exercising his right to remain silent.” DiGiovanni v. United States, 596
F.2d 74, 75 (2nd Cir. 1979).
This also demonstrates why the Court of Appeals’ recent decision in State v.
Jimenez, ___ P.3d ___, 2015 WL 7785141 (Idaho Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2015), pet review
filed,6 where it has adopted a rule allowing the district court to draw precisely this sort of

The Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in a companion case, State v. Van
Komen, ___ P.3d ___, 2015 WL 7785342 (Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2015), pet. review filed.
Van Komen is based on the same rationales as Jimenez, and so, it should also be
rejected for the reasons discussed in this brief.
6

20

inference, is manifestly wrong and unjust, and so, should not be relied upon as
controlling authority in this case.7 See Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho
72, 77 (1990) (articulating the standard for rejecting the principle of stare decisis).
For example, Jimenez construes Estrada narrowly, limiting its application to only
the Sixth Amendment/effective assistance of counsel context:
Jimenez does not contest that he received the warnings required under
Estrada. Second, Estrada does not address the scope of the Fifth
Amendment protections or the propriety of a sentencing court drawing
adverse inferences when a defendant declines to participate in a
psychosexual evaluation. Third, neither Estrada nor Idaho law, in general,
address to what extent a sentencing court may take into account a
defendant’s refusal to participate in the evaluation when determining a
proper sentence. Therefore, Jimenez’s reliance on Estrada is misplaced.
Jimenez, 2015 WL 7785141, *2. That analysis is contrary to both the Estrada opinion
itself, as well as previous decisions by the Court of Appeals.
First, Estrada itself rejected the notion that it was only addressing the Sixth
Amendment’s protections: “The real issue presented by this case is the significance
and extent of a defendant’s right against self-incrimination.” Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564.
The Estrada Court also rejected an argument that the Fifth Amendment right should be
construed narrowly:
The State argued in its briefing and at oral argument that this court should
interpret incrimination extremely narrowly, such that a defendant’s right
not to disclose applies only to matters that would subject him to additional
As Jimenez is not yet final, it is not controlling precedent, and so, its erroneous
analysis should not be applied in this case. In the event it becomes final in its current
form before this Court rules on this case, Jimenez should be rejected as binding
precedent. Whether that constitutes an abrogation or overruling of Jimenez depends on
which Court decides this case, as the Idaho Supreme Court does not review to overrule
the decisions of the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Clinton, 155 Idaho at 272 n.1;
compare State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 80 (2015) (explaining the analysis and
conclusions in a Court of Appeals’ opinion was flawed, and thus, effectively abrogating
that decision).

7
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criminal charges or that would prompt a judge to exceed the sentencing
standards that would otherwise apply. Incrimination is implicated not just
when additional charges could be filed, but also when punishment could
be enhanced as a result of the defendant's statements. Pens v. Bail, 902
F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that use of admission of past crimes,
during state-ordered psychotherapeutic treatment, to enhance sentence
violated defendant’s right against self-incrimination) . . . . Imposition of a
harsher sentence within this expansive range [of permissible sentencing
under the applicable statute] based on a defendant’s statements in a
psychological evaluation is a violation of the right against selfincrimination.
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564 (remainder of string citation omitted). That is consistent with
the United States Supreme Court’s discussion of the scope of the Fifth Amendment:
“[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to
guard,” which includes that defendants will “suffer no penalty for such silence.” Estelle,
451 U.S. at 467-68.
However, like the argument Estrada rejected, the Jimenez decision narrowly
limits the scope of the Fifth Amendment right:

“prohibiting only negative factual

inferences as to the circumstances and details of the crime based upon a defendant's
silence.” Jimenez, 2015 WL 7785141, *2. Since the Idaho Supreme Court has already
rejected that sort of narrow reading of the right, Jimenez’s determination – that “neither
Estrada nor Idaho law, in general, address to what extent a sentencing court may take
into account a defendant’s refusal to participate in the evaluation when determining a
proper sentence,” Jimenez, 2015 WL 7785141, *2 – is manifestly wrong in applying that
narrow scope.
Second, in previous decisions, the Court of Appeals itself has given effect to a
broader reading of the rule from Estrada:
Fifth Amendment rights come into play, however, if disclosures made
during a competency evaluation, or medical conclusions derived from
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such disclosures, are later used against the defendant either at the guilt or
penalty phase of the proceedings. [Estelle, 451 U.S. at 465]. See also
Estrada, 143 Idaho at 564, 149 P.3d at 839 (“incrimination is implicated …
when punishment could be enhanced as a result of the defendant’s
statements.”)
State v. Velasco, 154 Idaho 534, 536 (Ct. App. 2013). Therefore, Jimenez’s attempt to
limit Estrada to only situations dealing with the Sixth Amendment right to be effectively
advised by counsel – “Jimenez does not contest that he received the warnings required
under Estrada,” Jimenez, 2015 WL 7785141, *2 – is also manifestly wrong, further
evidencing why this Court should abrogate or overrule it.
Ultimately, though, a proper reading of Estrada reveals the answer to the
question about whether a district court judge can draw adverse inferences from the
defendant’s decision to exercise his constitutional right to not disclose information
during the PSE in Idaho – it cannot. Therefore, this Court should reject the State’s
argument for a contrary ruling.
b.

The State Overstates The Scope Of The Purported Open Question

To the extent this question remains open, it is not as broad as the State believes.
The State’s argument that this is an open question hinges on the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in White v. Woodall, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014).
However, in that case, the United States Supreme Court was only evaluating whether
the defendant had established the prerequisites to bring a federal habeas claim under
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Id. at 1701-02. Specifically, the defendant had to show the
decision below was contrary to “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States,” before his claim could proceed.

Id. (internal

quotation omitted). All the White Court held was that the issue was not clearly resolved
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by the United States Supreme Court because it had never been directly raised to that
Court, and thus, held the defendant had failed to satisfy the prerequisites to raise his
claim under Section 2254(d). Id. at 1702. In so doing, it left open the possibility that
states could have resolved this question on their own, as the Idaho Supreme Court
effectively has.
The White Court also made it very clear that “[w]e need not decide here, and
express no view on, whether the conclusion that a no-adverse-inference instruction was
required would be correct in a case not reviewed through the lens of § 2254(d)(1).” Id.
at 1703 (emphasis added). Therefore, even if the question were open in the context of
Section 2254(d)(1), since Mr. Jorgensen’s claim was not brought pursuant to Section
2254(d), the underlying discussions of the Fifth Amendment in cases such as Estelle
and Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999), are still controlling in this case. See
White, 134 Idaho at 1702. Thus, the State’s reading of White – to the effect that all the
United States Supreme Court’s prior decisions about the Fifth Amendment in this regard
are not controlling in this case (see Resp. Br., pp.14-22) – is overbroad and should be
rejected.
Since Estelle and Mitchell are still controlling in Mr. Jorgensen’s case, the State’s
argument, which, as discussed supra, is contrary to Estelle, should be rejected.
Similarly, since it is based on a similar analysis, this Court should reject the analysis in
the Court of Appeals’ decision in Jimenez, as its manifestly-wrong holding is directly
contrary to Estelle. Compare Jimenez, 2015 WL 7785141, *4 (holding that the district
court may draw adverse inferences from the defendant’s decision to not answer the
psychologist’s questions); with Estelle, 451 U.S. at 468-69 (“If, upon being adequately
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warned, respondent [defendant] had indicated he would not answer [the psychiatrist’s]
questions, . . . the State must make its case on future dangerousness in some other
way.”).
For any and all of these reasons, the district court’s actions regarding
Mr. Jorgensen’s sentence violated his Fifth Amendment right to not disclose information
during the PSE process.

Therefore, this Court should vacate that unconstitutional

sentence.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Jorgensen respectfully requests this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate or, alternatively, remand this case for a new sentencing determination which
comports with the Constitution.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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